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The future of retail payments: opportunities and challenges 
 
The way people pay is continuously changing, as a result of innovations in retail 
payments, improvements in efficiency and regulatory changes. This changing 
environment creates opportunities for some and challenges for others in the retail 
payments sector. The impact of these changes on the future of retail payments was 
the main theme of the biannual retail payments conference organised by the European 
Central Bank (ECB), this time in cooperation with the Oesterreichische Nationalbank 
(OeNB), on 12 and 13 May 2011 in Vienna. More than 200 high-level policymakers, 
financial sector representatives, academics and central bankers from Europe and other 
regions attended this conference, reflecting the topicality of and interest in the retail 
payments market.  
 
The aim of the conference was to better understand current developments in retail 
payment markets and to identify possible future trends, by bringing together 
policymaking, research activities and market practice. A number of key insights and 
conclusions emerged. The Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) project is recognised 
as being on the right track, even though some further work needs to be done in the 
areas of standardisation of card payments and migration towards SEPA instruments. 
The European Commission’s proposal for a regulation setting an end date for 
migration to SEPA credit transfers and SEPA direct debits is welcomed. For SEPA to 
be a success, it is essential that users are involved, in order to ensure acceptance of 
the SEPA instruments. Moreover, innovations in retail payments are taking place 
more rapidly than ever, and payment service providers and regulators need to adapt 
quickly to this changing business environment. 
 
We would like to thank all participants in the conference for the very interesting 
discussions. In particular, we would like to acknowledge the valuable contributions 
and insights provided by all speakers, discussants, session chairpersons and 
panellists, whose names can be found in the conference programme. Their main 
statements are highlighted in the ECB-OeNB official conference summary. Six 4
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papers related to the conference have been accepted for publication in this special 
series of the ECB Working Papers Series.  
 
Behind the scenes, a number of colleagues from the ECB and the OeNB contributed 
to both the organisation of the conference and the preparation of these conference 
proceedings. In alphabetical order, many thanks to Nicola Antesberger, Stefan 
Augustin, Michael Baumgartner, Christiane Burger, Stephanie Czák, Susanne 
Drusany, Henk Esselink, Susan Germain de Urday, Monika Hartmann, Monika 
Hempel, Wiktor Krzyzanowski, Thomas Lammer, Tobias Linzert, Alexander 
Mayrhofer, Hannes Nussdorfer, Simonetta Rosati, Daniela Russo, Wiebe Ruttenberg, 
Heiko Schmiedel, Doris Schneeberger, Francisco Tur Hartmann, Pirjo Väkevainen 
and Juan Zschiesche Sánchez. 
 
 
Gertrude  Tumpel-Gugerell       Wolfgang  Duchatczek 
Former member of the Executive Board       Vice Governor 
European Central Bank           Oesterreichische Nationalbank 
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In this paper, we discuss how fraud liability regimes impact the price structure that
is chosen by a monopolistic payment platform, in a setting where merchants can invest
in fraud detection technologies. We show that liability allocation rules distort the price
structure charged by platforms or banks to consumers and merchants with respect to a case
where such a responsibility regime is not implemented. We determine the allocation of fraud
losses between the payment platform and the merchants that maximises the platform￿ s pro￿t
and we compare it to the allocation that maximises social welfare.
JEL Codes: G21, L31, L42.
Keywords: Payment card systems, interchange fees, two-sided markets, fraud, liability.
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The development of electronic data exchange in the banking industry has generated an increase
in fraud and cybercrime. For instance, in the United-States, according to the Consumer Sentinel
Network (CSN), 1.2 million complaints of consumer fraud have been recorded in 2008.1 As a
consequence, banks can make substantial losses because of fraudulent use of payment cards,
which di⁄er across countries and payment systems (See table 1).
Table 1: Loss rate per $100 payment card transaction value in several countries2
Country Spain Australia France UK US
Losses rate 2.24c / 2.39c / 5c / 9.12c / 9.2c /
Minimizing the occurrence of fraud in electronic payment systems requires costly e⁄orts
from all the participants to a transaction: platforms, banks, consumers and merchants.3 For
instance, consumers have to protect their personal data and to report the fraud rapidly once
it occurs, whereas platforms, banks and merchants may invest substantial amounts in fraud
detection technologies.4 These e⁄orts in fraud prevention depend on the expected amount of
losses and their allocation, which responds to several liability rules, determined either by public
laws or by private network rules. Currently, in most payment card systems, consumers hardly
bear meaningful liability for fraudulent use of their payment card, because they are protected
both by ￿nancial regulations, which are public laws (e.g. TILA and regulation Z in the United-
States)5, and by the ￿ zero liability rule￿ , which has been privately adopted by several payment
networks. It follows that, in most payment systems, the burden of fraud losses is shared between
banks or platforms and merchants.6 The allocation of liability between banks and merchants
1Source: Consumer Sentinel Network Data Book for January-December 2008, Federal Trade Commission,
February 2009. This report highlights that credit card fraud is the most common form of reported identity theft
amounting at 20% of the reported fraudulent transactions.
2Source: Richard Sullivan (2010), Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, ￿ The Changing Nature of Payment
Card Fraud: Issues for Industry and Public Policy￿ .
3According to the Federal Reserve Board, in the United-States, "On average, by transaction type, issuers
incurred 2.2c / per signature-debit transaction for fraud-prevention and data-security activities and 1.2c / per PIN-
debit transaction. Similarly, networks incurred 0.7c / per signature-debit transaction for fraud-prevention and
data-security activities and 0.6c / per PIN-debit transaction. Finally, acquirers incurred 0.4c / per signature-debit
transaction for fraud-prevention and data-security activities and 0.3c / per PIN-debit transaction.". Source: Fed-
eral Register / Vol. 75, No. 248 / Tuesday, December 28, 2010 / Proposed Rules.
4According to a survey conducted by the Federal Reserve Board in the United-States, issuers engage in various
fraud-prevention activities such as "transaction monitoring and fraud risk scoring systems that may trigger an
alert or call to the cardholder in order to con￿rm the legitimacy of a transaction". "Merchants also have
fraud-prevention data-security costs, including costs related to compliance with payment card industry data-
security standards (PCI-DSS) and other tools to prevent fraud, such as address veri￿cation services or internally
developped fraud screening models, particularly for card-not-present transactions".
5For a comparison of consumer protection laws across various countries, see Appendix A.
6For instance, in France, according to the "Observatoire de la sØcuritØ des cartes de paiement", fraud losses
have been shared in 2009 between banks (41.1%) and merchants (53.5%). Merchants have been held liable mainly
for fraud on internet transactions. Consumers were held liable for only 2.3% of the fraud losses. According to
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to accept the electronic payment instrument. In the short term, the existence of a fraud liability
regime a⁄ects the pricing structure of the payments system. With respect to the standard price
structure in two-sided markets (Rochet-Tirole, 2003), the price structure that we obtain takes
into account the platform￿ s trade-o⁄between maximising its pro￿t and minimizing the expected
loss on fraudulent transactions. If the zero liability rule for consumers applies, the allocation of
fraud losses that is chosen by the payment platform does not place enough liability on merchants
to maximise social welfare. Therefore, liability regimes can be used by monopolistic payment
platforms to extract rents from merchants, as it enables them to charge higher prices. We
also ￿nd that this result does not hold if investments are shared between the platform and the
merchants.
We also determine the incidence of the liability regime on the choice of the interchange fee.
We ￿nd that, if the issuers are imperfectly competitive, whereas the acquirers are perfectly
competitive, the pro￿t maximising interchange fee decreases with the level of liability that is
borne by merchants.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we summarize the literature
related to our study. In Section 3, we develop a theoretical model to analyze the optimal
allocation of fraud losses between the payment platform and the merchants. In section 4, we
determine the pro￿t maximising allocation of fraud losses. In section 5, we study the welfare
maximising allocation of fraud losses. In section 6, we analyze the role of interchange fees. In
section 7, we extend the model by studying the optimal allocation of investments between the
payment platform and the merchants. Finally, we conclude.
To our knowledge, this paper is the ￿rst attempt to model fraud detection technologies and
liability regimes in the literature on payment systems. Our approach thus relies on three
di⁄erent strands of literature: the literature on payment platforms, on investment in two-sided
markets, and ￿nally the literature on liability issues in law and economics.
Most papers on payment systems focus on explaining the divergence between the pro￿t
maximising price structure that is charged by payment platforms and the price structure that
maximises social welfare (see Chakravorti (2010) for a review). In particular, several papers
aim at determining whether payment platforms charge excessive interchange fees when they
maximise banks￿ joint pro￿t (as surveyed by Verdier, 2011). Our paper contributes to this
literature by extending Rochet-Tirole (2003) to study how the allocation of the expected fraud
loss between the platform and the merchants changes the pro￿t-maximising price structure.
2 Related Literature10
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We build a model in which a monopolistic payment platform o⁄ers an Electronic Payment
Instrument (hereafter the EPI) to consumers and merchants. We extend Rochet and Tirole
(2003) along several dimensions. We consider that there is an exogenous probability that the
EPI is fraudulently used, in a setting where merchants can invest in fraud detection technologies.
We de￿ne fraud as the use of an electronic payment instrument (or its information) by a person
other than its owner, to obtain goods and services without authority for such use. The fraud
entails a lump sum loss which does not depend on the transaction value. Our framework enables
us to determine how fraud liability should be allocated between the participants to maximise
the platform￿ s pro￿t. It also enables us to compare the private optimal allocation to the one
that maximises social welfare.
Payment system and allocation of fraud: A monopolistic payment platform provides
an electronic payment instrument (e.g. the payment card) to consumers and merchants. The
marginal cost of processing a transaction is denoted by c. Consumers and merchants pay
transaction fees to the platform, which are denoted by f and m respectively.
When consumers use the EPI, there is an exogenous probability x 2 (0;1) that the payment
instrument is intercepted by fraudsters.11 There is also a probability q 2 [0;1] that the fraud
is detected, which depends on merchants￿investments. If the fraud is not detected, all the
participants to the transaction make an exogenous loss that we denote by L > 0. The loss
is allocated between the consumer, the merchant and the payment platform as follows: the
consumer (or buyer B) and the merchant (or seller S) bear respectively a share ￿B and ￿S of
the loss, where ￿S + ￿B 2 [0;1]. The rest of the loss, ￿P = 1 ￿ (￿S + ￿B), is borne by the
payment platform. We assume that the parameter ￿B is determined by public laws and we
consider it as exogenous to the model. In particular, if ￿B = 0, the zero liability rule applies
for consumers. The parameter ￿S is privately chosen by the payment platform.12 We choose
to normalize the fraud on cash payments to zero.13
11The assumption that x is exogenous is made for simplicity. Indeed, endogenizing x would introduce another
trade-o⁄ for the merchant. Higher investments in fraud detection technologies have two e⁄ects on hackers￿
incentives to fraud. On the one hand, higher investments in fraud increase the volume of transactions, which
increases the hackers￿incentives to commit fraud. On the other hand, higher investments increase the probability
that a fraud is detected, which may discourage hackers to commit fraud.
12In our model, we do not study how the losses are allocated between banks and the payment platform. In
practice, payment platforms design rules to allocate the losses between issuing and acquiring banks and also
to allocate the losses between banks and the platform itself. This issue would deserve a separate study. We
reintroduce banks in section 4 and choose to focus on the role of interchange fees in fraud prevention issues.
13Introducing the probability that a fraudulent payment is made by cash would not change the trade-o⁄s that
we highlight in our model. We would only have to modify assumption (A2) to take into account the losses that
are due to fraud on cash payments.
3 The model12
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We start by determining the probability that a consumer wishes to use the Electronic Payment





is randomly matched to one merchant, who may or may not accept the EPI. If the merchant
accepts the EPI, the consumer chooses his payment method by comparing his expected utility
if he pays cash and if he pays with the EPI.
Let us start by the case in which the merchant does not accept the EPI. If the merchant
sets p ￿ v, the consumer wishes to buy the good by paying cash, as his surplus v￿p is positive.
Otherwise, he does not buy the good.
Now consider the case in which the merchant accepts the EPI. If the merchant sets p ￿ v,
the consumer wishes to buy the good, as he obtains at least a positive surplus if he pays cash.
He decides to use the EPI if his expected utility is higher than if he pays cash. It follows that,
if p ￿ v, a consumer wishes to use the EPI if and only if:
v ￿ p + bB ￿ f ￿ ￿B(1 ￿ q)xL ￿ v ￿ p,
that is, if and only if
bB ￿ f ￿ ￿B(1 ￿ q)xL ￿ 0:
If the merchant sets p > v, the consumer never uses cash. The consumer buys the good and
pays with the EPI if and only if
v ￿ p + bB ￿ f ￿ ￿B(1 ￿ q)xL ￿ 0.
We denote by DB the probability that a consumer wishes to use the EPI. Considering consumers￿





1 ￿ HB(f + ￿B(1 ￿ q)xL) if p ￿ v
1 ￿ HB(f + ￿B(1 ￿ q)xL + p ￿ v) if p > v.
Note that the probability that the consumer wishes to use the EPI decreases with the
transaction fee, the consumer￿ s liability, the expected amount of fraud loss, but increases with
the probability that the fraud is detected.
4 The equilibrium:
4.1 Stage 3: consumer payment decisions15
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4.2.1 Prices and card acceptance condition
We now determine the price that is chosen by each merchant, along with the decision to accept
the EPI and invest in fraud detection technologies. We start by showing that, because of
assumptions (A1) and (A2), the pro￿t of a merchant who accepts the EPI is maximised when
he sets a price such that cash-users are not excluded from the market. It follows that merchants
who accept the EPI and merchants who do not accept the EPI choose the same price. This
enables us to derive the EPI acceptance condition.
Lemma 1 Each monopolistic merchant maximises its pro￿t by setting p￿ = v.
Proof. See Appendix B.
We are now able to derive the condition under which a merchant accepts the electronic
payment instrument. A merchant accepts the EPI if he makes more pro￿t by doing so, that is
if
v ￿ d + DB(f + ￿B(1 ￿ q)xL)(bS ￿ ￿Sx(1 ￿ q)L ￿ m ￿ CS(eS)) ￿ v ￿ d.
Since DB(f + ￿B(1 ￿ q)xL) ￿ 0, this condition is equivalent to
bS ￿ ￿Sx(1 ￿ q)L ￿ m ￿ CS(eS) ￿ 0. (2)
Note that a merchant does not accept the EPI if the merchant fee is high or if the amount of
the expected fraud loss is high.
4.2.2 Investment in fraud detection technologies
A merchant that accepts the EPI can invest in fraud detection technologies. The amount of
investment in fraud detection technologies, which we denote by e￿
S, maximises the merchant￿ s
pro￿t under the constraint that the merchant accepts the EPI.
Lemma 2 If the merchant fee is not too high, all merchants such that bS ￿ b bS(￿S;￿B;x;L;m;f)
























4.2 Stage 2: EPI acceptance and investments in fraud detection16
ECB





 !&% & %&&+ ! & ! %'$/%   &! &  (%& &
0!$&
 522+ -:: EE:C9>M 
.=: B:G8=6CI 8=DDH:H >IH ;G6J9 EG:K:CI>DC :WDGI HD 6H ID :FJ6A>O: I=: B6G<>C6A 7:C:PIH D;
>CK:HIB:CIH >C ;G6J9 9:I:8I>DC I:8=CDAD<>:H 6C9 I=: B6G<>C6A 8DHI D; >CK:HIB:CIH .=: B6G<>C6A
7:C:PIH D; >CK:HIB:CIH 6G: :FJ6A ID I=: B6G<>C6A <6>CH ;GDB ADL:G :ME:8I:9 ;G6J9 ADHH:H I:GB
,!(!" >C 	 6C9 ID I=: B6G<>C6A 7:C:PIH I=6I 6G: 9J: ID 6C >C8G:6H: >C I=: KDAJB:




& : IJ H9 : I 6 > A: 6 8 =D ;I = :I L D: W : 8 I HI = 6 IL > A A7 :G : ; : G G : 9I D6 HI = :*"& !%% 0& 6C9
I=: &$ %&!  (!' 0&  >GHI	 >; I=: B:G8=6CI >CK:HIH >C ;G6J9 9:I:8I>DC I:8=CDAD<>:H	
I=>H >C8G:6H:H I=: EGD767>A>IN I=6I 6 ;G6J9JA:CI IG6CH68I>DC >H 9:I:8I:9	 6C9 I=:G:;DG:	 I=>H
G:9J8:H I=: 6BDJCI D; I=: :ME:8I:9 ADHH I=6I =: =6H ID 7:6G L=:C =: 688:EIH I=: * # . = :
:ME:8I:9 ADHH :W:8I =6H 6 EDH>I>K: >BE68I DC B:G8=6CIRH >CK:HIB:CIH -:8DC9	 >; 8DCHJB:GH 7:6G
6 EDH>I>K: H=6G: D; ;G6J9 ADHH:H	 I=: EGD767>A>IN I=6I 6 8DCHJB:G L>H=:H ID JH: I=: :A:8IGDC>8
E6NB:CI >CHIGJB:CI >H >BE68I:9 EDH>I>K:AN 7N I=: B:G8=6CIRH >CK:HIB:CIH	 6H I=: :ME:8I:9 ADHH
9:8G:6H:H .=: IG6CH68I>DC KDAJB: :W:8I =6H 6AHD 6 EDH>I>K: >BE68I DC B:G8=6CIRH >CK:HIB:CIH
,:B6G@ I=6I	 7:86JH: D; I=: IG6CH68I>DC KDAJB: :W:8I >; 	  	 I=: B:G8=6CIH >CK:HI
>C ;G6J9 EG:K:CI>DC I:8=CDAD<>:H :K:C >; I=:N 7:6G CD A>67>A>IN ;DG ;G6J9	 I=6I >H >;   # C
ILD
H>9:9 B6G@:IH	 I=: A>67>A>IN G:<>B: >H CDI I=: DCAN >C8:CI>K: I=6I 86C 7: JH:9 ID :C8DJG6<:
B:G8=6CI >CK:HIB:CI	 6H B:G8=6CIH 86G: 67DJI I=: IG6CH68I>DC KDAJB:	 L=>8= >H G:A6I:9 ID
8DCHJB:G 9:B6C9 .=>H :W:8I >H CDI EG:H:CI >C I=: A>I:G6IJG: DC A6L 6C9 :8DCDB>8H I=6I L:
B:CI>DC:9 >C H:8I>DC 
(DI: 6AHD I=6I B:G8=6CIH :M:GI 6 EDH>I>K: :MI:GC6A>IN DC I=: E6NB:CI EA6I;DGB 6C9 DC
8DCHJB:GH >; 	  	 7:86JH: I=:>G >CK:HIB:CI >C ;G6J9 9:I:8I>DC I:8=CDAD<>:H G:9J8:H I=:
6BDJCI D; I=:>G :ME:8I:9 ;G6J9 ADHH
#; 	  	 I=: O:GD A>67>A>IN GJA: 6EEA>:H ;DG 8DCHJB:GH #C I=>H 86H:	 6AA B:G8=6CIHL = D















H >CK:HIB:CIH 9D CDI >BE68I 8DCHJB:G 9:B6C9	 I=: IG6CH68I>DC KDAJB: :W:8I >H CJAA JC9:G I=:
O:GD A>67>A>IN GJA:  B:G8=6CI L=D D7I6>CH 6 =><=:G IG6CH68I>DC 7:C:PI 9D:H CDI =6K: =><=:G
>CK:HIB:CI >C8:CI>K:H	 6H I=: B6G<>C6A 7:C:PIH D7I6>C:9 I=GDJ<= 6 =><=:G IG6CH68I>DC KDAJB:
6G: :FJ6A ID O:GD17
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1390
October 2011
4.2.3 Comparative statics
In Lemma 3, we give some comparative statics to explain how a merchant￿ s investment in fraud
detection technologies vary with the transaction fees, the liability levels and the bene￿t that a
merchant obtains of being paid with the electronic payment instrument.
Lemma 3 If ￿B > 0, the merchant￿ s investments in fraud detection technologies increase with
the consumer liability, the consumer transaction fee, the merchant￿ s transactional bene￿t, and
the merchant￿ s liability, but they decrease with the merchant fee.
Proof. See Appendix D.
We proved in Lemma 2 that a merchant￿ s investments in fraud detection technologies are
chosen such that the marginal bene￿ts are equal to the marginal costs of investments. If the
merchant fee increases (resp. if the merchant￿ s transactional bene￿t increases), all other things
being equal, the marginal bene￿ts from investment decrease, because of a reduction of the
transaction volume e⁄ect. The merchant reacts by reducing its investments in fraud detection
technologies.
If the merchant￿ s liability increases, this increases the expected loss e⁄ect, because the
merchant has more to save when a fraud is detected, whereas this decreases the transaction
volume e⁄ect, as the merchant￿ s margin per transaction is reduced. Under Assumption (A2),
the ￿rst e⁄ect dominates and the merchant reacts by increasing its investments in fraud detection
technologies.
Moreover, if the consumer liability increases or if the consumer fee increases, this increases
the transaction volume e⁄ect, because the impact of merchant￿ s investments on consumer de-
mand increase. Therefore, the merchant￿ s investments increase.
If the zero liability rule applies, from (4), the merchant￿ s investments in fraud detection
technologies do not depend on the transaction fees that are chosen by the payment platform.
They only depend on the merchant￿ s liability and the expected loss. As when ￿B > 0, they
decrease with the merchant￿ s liability and it can be shown that they decrease with the expected
fraud loss.
In Lemma 4, we determine how the transaction fees and the liability levels impact the
probability that a merchant accepts the electronic payment instrument.
Lemma 4 The probability that a merchant accepts the EPI decreases with the merchant fee,
with the consumer fee and with the level of liability that is borne by merchants.
Proof. See Appendix E.18
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A higher merchant fee lowers the transaction margin that the merchant obtains if he accepts
the EPI, whereas it reduces the merchant￿ s incentives to accept the EPI, which is a standard
e⁄ect in the literature on payment cards. Moreover, in our model, the probability that a mer-
chant accepts the EPI also depends on the consumer fee, because merchants exert a positive
externality on consumers when they choose to invest in fraud detection technologies. Indeed,
this interaction, which is novel in the literature on payment platforms, arises when ￿B 6= 0 and
this is speci￿c to our model setting. Finally, a higher consumer fee decreases the probability
that a consumer wishes to use the EPI, which reduces the marginal bene￿ts of investing in fraud
detection technologies and the bene￿ts of accepting the EPI for the merchant. Therefore, the
probability that a merchant accepts the EPI decreases with the consumer fee.
Most importantly, our model is the ￿rst to highlight the impact of liability regimes on
merchants￿acceptance of payment media. We show in Appendix E that the level of liability
has an ambiguous impact on merchants￿choice to accept the electronic payment instrument.
On the one hand, a higher liability level increases the loss in case of a fraudulent use of the
EPI, which discourages merchants to accept the EPI. On the other hand, it increases the level
of e⁄ort made by merchants, which reduces the probability that the EPI is fraudulently used
- and thus increases the probability that a consumer wishes to use the EPI. From assumption
(A2), the ￿rst e⁄ect dominates in our framework, and therefore, the probability that a merchant
accepts the EPI decreases with his liability level.
At the ￿rst stage, the payment platform choses the prices that maximise its pro￿t,
￿P = (f + m ￿ c)VP ￿ ELP,




h(bS)(1 ￿ HB(f + ￿BxL(1 ￿ q￿))dbS; (5)
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If ￿B = 0, as q￿ does not depend on bS, we have
ELP = ￿PxL(1 ￿ q￿)VP: (7)
Note that, for all ￿B 2 [0;1], the transaction volume decreases with the consumer transaction
fee and with the merchant fee. While this e⁄ect is standard in the literature, another question
arises in our framework, that is the impact of the transaction prices and the merchants￿liability
on the expected fraud loss that is borne by the payment platform.
4.3.1 Variations of the expected loss with the prices
We start by determining how the expected fraud loss is impacted by the choice of transaction
fees and by the level of liability that is borne by merchants.
Proposition 1 The expected loss incurred by the payment platform on fraudulent transactions
(ELP) decreases with the consumer transaction fee and with the level of liability that is borne by
merchants. ELP decreases with the merchant fee only if the elasticity of the merchant￿ s e⁄ort
to the merchant fee is small or if the elasticity of the merchant￿ s demand to the merchant fee is
high.
Proof. See Appendix F.
An increase in the consumer fee decreases the number of merchants who accept the EPI,
whereas it increases merchants￿investments in fraud detection technologies. It follows that a
higher consumer fee decreases the expected loss that is incurred by the payment platform.
Moreover, a higher level of liability for merchants decreases the expected loss that is borne
by the payment platform, as it decreases merchants￿acceptance of the EPI, whereas it increases
merchants￿investment in fraud detection technologies.
An increase in the merchant fee has two e⁄ects on the expected loss that is incurred by
the payment platform. The higher the merchant fee, the lower the number of merchants who
accept the EPI, and the lower the transaction volume. This e⁄ect reduces the expected loss
that is incurred by the payment platform. At the same time, a higher merchant fee decreases
the merchants￿investment in fraud detection technologies, which increases the expected loss
that is borne by the payment platform. The impact of an increase in the merchant fee on the
expected loss depends on how both e⁄ects compensate each other.
4.3.2 The pro￿t maximising price structure
Proposition 2 gives the pro￿t maximising price structure for a given level of merchants￿liability.20
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4.3.3 The pro￿t maximising level of liability
We have assumed that the payment platform has the opportunity to choose the merchant￿ s level
of liability at the same stage as the transaction prices. Thus, we start by determining how the
merchant￿ s level of liability impacts the plaform￿ s pro￿t. We know from Proposition 1 that the
expected loss that is borne by the payment platform decreases with the level of liability borne
by merchants. It remains to study how the level of liability borne by merchants impacts the




















The ￿rst term of (12) is negative. It re￿ ects the fact that fewer merchants accept the EPI when
the level of liability that is borne by merchants increases. The second term of (12) is positive. It
shows that more consumers wish to pay with the EPI when merchants invest in fraud detection
technologies. It follows that a higher level of liability for merchants has an ambiguous impact
on the transaction volume. Note that if the elasticity of the merchants￿demand to their liability
level is small (that is, if term I is small), the transaction volume may increase with the merchants￿
level of liability. Moreover, if the zero liability rule applies for consumers, the second term of (12)
is null, and the transaction volume decreases with the merchant￿ s level of liability. Proposition
3 gives the pro￿t maximising level of liability for merchants.
Proposition 3 A monopolistic payment platform chooses a level of liability for merchants that
re￿ects a trade-o⁄ between minimizing the expected loss on fraudulent transactions and max-
imising the transaction volume. The interior solution for the pro￿t maximising level of liability
for merchants solves







If the transaction volume increases with the liability level that is borne by merchants, there is a
corner solution such that the payment platform lets the merchants bear all the losses.
Proof. The payment platform chooses the level of liability that maximises its pro￿t. Solving
for the ￿rst-order condition of pro￿t maximisation yields
@￿P
@￿S
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The payment platform does not place enough liability on merchants to maximise social
welfare, except in the case where it is maximises its pro￿t by letting the merchants bear the
maximum liability on fraudulent transactions. This is because the payment platform internalizes
imperfectly the impact of the liability regimes on consumer and merchant surplus. Note that
this result is driven by the assumption that the probability to detect a fraudulent transaction
only depends on merchants￿investment. The result could change if the investments were shared
by the payment platform and by the merchants.
In this section, we examine an important regulatory challenge, which is the impact of merchant
liability on the level of interchange fees.22 This issue has been examined in the United-States
after the vote of the Dodd-Frank act in July 2010, which gives to the Federal Reserve Board
the power to regulate interchange fees on debit card transactions. Among the regulatory rules,
the "fraud adjustment rulemaking" provides the Board with the opportunity to assess how card
networks￿authorization choices and fraud procedures may burden the merchant community
and potentially increase the volume of debit card fraud. The rulemaking also gives the Board
the opportunity to promote the use of the fraud adjustment mechanism as a means of creating
incentives for banks and merchants to migrate to more e⁄ective fraud detection technologies.
To study this issue, we modify our model setting, by making the standard assumption that
the payment platform is now composed of imperfectly competitive issuers and perfectly compet-
itive acquirers.23 We also assume for simplicity of the model that consumers bear no liability
on fraudulent transactions (￿B = 0). The issuers charge a fee f￿(cI ￿ a) to the consumers,
whereas the acquirers charge merchants with their perceived marginal cost, that is m￿ = a+cA.
As in the literature, we make the standard assumption that f￿ is decreasing with a, and that
the pass-through rate is lower than one, that is @f￿=@a ￿ 1. At the ￿rst stage of the game,
the payment platform chooses the level of interchange fee that maximises banks￿joint pro￿t.
Then banks choose the transaction prices, merchants invest in fraud detection technologies and
consumers make their payments decisions. We denote the pro￿t maximising interchange fee by
aP, and study how the pro￿t maximising interchange fee is impacted by the level of liability
that is borne by merchants.
Proposition 5 If the issuers are imperfectly competitive and if the acquirers are perfectly com-
petitive, the pro￿t maximising interchange fee decreases with the level of liability that is borne
22Interchange fees are paid by the acquiring bank to the issuing bank each time a consumer makes a transaction.
23For instance, this assumption is also made in Rochet and Tirole (2002).
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by merchants.
Proof. See Appendix K.
Proposition 4 has important implications for regulatory decisions about interchange fees.
It means that, if merchants bear a higher share of the loss on fraudulent transactions, the
pro￿t maximising interchange fee becomes lower. The result of Proposition 4 may change if
consumers are held liable for fraudulent transactions. In this case, merchants￿investments
are impacted by the transaction fees and by the interchange fee that is chosen by the payment
platform. The payment platform may decide either to lower or to increase the interchange fee to
provide merchants with incentives to increase their investment in fraud detection technologies,
depending on the relative importance of the expected loss e⁄ect and the transaction volume
e⁄ect that we highlighted in Lemma 2.
Another interesting aspect of the problem is that regulators may wish to ￿x a maximum level
for the interchange fee, but the payment platform can react by adjusting the level of liability
that is borne by merchants for fraudulent transactions. In Appendix K, we show in a simple
example that, if the regulator chooses a low level for the interchange fee, the payment platform
reacts by choosing a high level of liability for merchants, which may not be desirable from the
point of view of social welfare.
We analyze if our welfare result holds in an extension of the model that allows the payment
platform to invest. In a supplementary note, that is available upon author￿ s request, we show
that the welfare result obtained under the zero liability rule does not hold.24 This is because
the prices chosen by the payment platform do not necessarily decrease with the level of liability
borne by merchants. The intuition of this result is the following. A higher level of liability for
merchants has three e⁄ects on the platform￿ s incentives to invest in fraud detection technolo-
gies. First, it lowers the transaction volume, which lowers the platform￿ s investments. Second,
it decreases the losses that are due to fraudulent transactions. This e⁄ect also lowers the plat-
form￿ s incentives to invest in fraud detection technologies. Finally, a higher level of liability for
merchants increases merchants￿investments. If the platform￿ s investments and the merchants￿
investments reinforce each other, the platform has higher incentives to invest in fraud detection
technologies. Therefore, the platform trades-o⁄between lowering the merchant fee to encourage
24Except in the case where the platform￿ s cost function is linear and if the detection probability is linear in the
platform￿ s investment e⁄ort.
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merchants￿investments and increasing the merchant fee to cover its investments costs. In this
case, the detection probability does not always increase with the level of liability that is borne
by merchants, since a higher liability for merchants may decrease the platform￿ s investments
incentives.
Our results highlight the fact that liability regimes can be used by monopolistic payment plat-
forms to extract rents from merchants. From the point of view of a social planner, payment
platforms do not place enough liability on merchants for investments that only depend on the
merchants￿side under the zero liability rule. This result changes if the platform shares the cost
of investments with merchants.
Another issue that deserves further research is the problem of compliance in payment sys-
tems. This paper has considered only prices and liability regimes as an incentive to encourage
merchant investment. However, we think that it would be interesting to compare the impact
of di⁄erent measures on investments and fraud losses such as compliance rules, price incentives
and liability shifts.
References
[1] ARANGO, C. & TAYLOR, V. (2008): "Merchants Acceptance, Costs and Perception of
Retail Payments: A Canadian Survey," Bank of Canada, Discussion Paper 2008-12.
[2] BEDRE-DEFOLIE O. & CALVANO E. (2009): "Pricing Payment Cards", ECB Working
Paper No 119.
[3] BELLEFLAMME, P. & PEITZ, M. (2010): "Platform Competition and Seller Investment
Incentives", Forthcoming in European Economic Review.
[4] BROWN, J. P. (1973) "Toward an Economic Theory of Liability," The Journal of Legal
Studies, 2,2: 323-349
[5] COOTER R. & ROBIN E. (1987), A Theory of Loss Allocation for Consumer Payments,
Texas Law Review, 63-129
8 Conclusion and discussion
9 References28
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1390
October 2011
45 "%,0),.#  SMI:GC6A>I>:H >C *6NB:CI 6G9 (:ILDG@H .=:DGN 6C9 K>

9:C8:	T ,:K>:L D; (:ILDG@ 8DCDB>8H	 KDA	 #HHJ: 	 GI>8A: 
45 ,#
'..## !  *,#-#   	 .=: 8DCDB>8H D; .DGI &6L  EGY8>H .=:
A<6G DBE6C>DC ID &6L 6C9 8DCDB>8H C9 :9	 9L6G9 A<6G *J7A>H=>C<
45 )/!&-   SC :M6B>C6I>DC D; I=: ;G6J9 A>67>A>IN H=>;I >C 8DCHJB:G 86G9

76H:9 E6NB:CI HNHI:BHT	  :9:G6A ,:H:GK: 6C@ D; =>86<D	 8DCDB>8 *:GHE:8I>K:H	  >GHI
+J6GI:G 
45  ,& ,-,0 ,!#-., :7>I 6G9 #CI:G8=6C<:  ::H 6C9 ,DJI>C< *GDEDH:9
,JA:	 0DA 	 (D 	 .J:H96N	 :8:B7:G 	 
45  /,&..# '  S.=: &6LH	 ,:<JA6I>DC 6C9 #C9JHIGN *G68I>8:H I=6I *GDI:8I DC

HJB:GH L=D JH: A:8IGDC>8 *6NB:CI -NHI:BH *DA>8N DCH>9:G6I>DCHT	 >H8JHH>DC *6E:G	
*6NB:CI 6G9H :CI:G	  :9:G6A ,:H:GK: 6C@ D; *=>A69:AE=>6
45 !.-	 .  $) %  S*6NB:CIH  G6J9 *:G8:EI>DC 0:GHJH ,:6A>I NU8 D C ; : G 

:C8: -JBB6GNT	 .>W6CN !6I:H 6C9 %6IN $68D7	 HI +J6GI:G 	 8DCDB>8 *:GHE:8I>K:H	
 :9:G6A ,:H:GK: 6C@ D; =>86<D
45 &(-	 1' 6C9 *)-(,	 , 	 .=: 8DCDB>8 -IGJ8IJG: D; .DGI &6L	 6B

7G>9<: ' "6GK6G9 /C>K:GH>IN *G:HH
45 )7H:GK6ID>G: 9: A6 HY8JG>IY 9:H 86GI:H 9: E6>:B:CI	 ,6EEDGI CCJ:A 
45 ,)". $
  .=: .=:DGN D; #CI:G8=6C<:  ::H  HNCI=:H>H D; G:8:CI 8DCIG>7J

I>DCH	 ,:K>:L D; (:ILDG@ 8DCDB>8H	 KDA 	 CD 	 $JC:	 EE 

45 ,)". $
  .#,)& $  DDE:G6I>DC BDC< DBE:I>IDGH .=: 8DCDB>8H




  .#,)&  *A6I;DGB DBE:I>I>DC >C .LD
->9:9 '6G@:IH	 $DJGC6A
D; I=: JGDE:6C 8DCDB>8 HHD8>6I>DC	 KDA 	 CD 	 EE 

45 ,)". $
  .#,)& $  .LD
H>9:9 B6G@:IH 6 EGD<G:HH G:EDGI	 ,(
$DJGC6A D; 8DCDB>8H	 KDA 	 CD 	 '6G8=	 EE 

45 -/&&#0(	 , $  .=: =6C<>C< (6IJG: D; /- 6G9 *6NB:CI  G6J9 #C9JHIGN
6C9 *J7A>8 *DA>8N )EI>DCHR	 8DCDB>8 ,:K>:L	 -:8DC9 +J6GI:G 	  :9:G6A ,:H:GK: 6C@
D; %6CH6H >IN29
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1390
October 2011
[19] VERDIER M. (2010): "Interchange Fees and Incentives to Invest in Quality of a Payment
Card System" (2010), International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol.28, pp. 539-554.
[20] VERDIER M. (2011): "Interchange Fees in Payment Card Systems: a Survey of the liter-
ature", Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol.25, Issue 2, pp.273-297.
[21] WRIGHT J. (2002): "Optimal Payment Card Systems," European Economic Review, vol.
47, no. 4, August, pp. 587-612.
[22] WRIGHT J. (2004): "Determinants of Optimal Interchange Fees in Payment Systems,"
Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. 52, no. 1, March, pp. 1-26.
Appendix A: Consumer Protection Laws in Various Countries. The following table
provides some examples of consumer protection laws in various countries. The common fea-
ture of consumer protection laws is that consumer bear hardly meaningful responsibility for
fraudulent use of cards in all countries.
Country Name of the Law Consumer Protection
USA TILA/Reg Z for credit cards Capped at $50 for all unauthorized transactions.
Debit Cards If the cardholder fails to notify the card issuer
within 2 days, the cardholder￿ s maximum liability
is $500, of which only $50 can be attributed to fraud
occurring during the ￿rst 2 days after the cardholder
learnt the loss or theft.
Europe Payment Service Directive The cardholder has 13 months to contest
an unauthorized transaction. The cardholder￿ s
liability is capped at 150 euros if he has failed
to keep the personnalized security measures safe.
If the cardholder was a victim from an identity theft,
he cannot be held liable. No liability in all cases after
the fraud is reported. Right for payment service users
to enjoy immediate refund of unauthorized
transactions following the establishment of the proof.
Appendix B: Proof of Lemma 1. We prove in Lemma 1 than the merchants who accept
the EPI and the merchants who do not accept the EPI set the same price p￿ = v. There are
10 Appendix30
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This quantity is negative if and only if
v ￿ d + bS ￿ ￿Sx(1 ￿ q)L ￿ m ￿ CS(eS) ￿
1 ￿ HB(f + ￿B(1 ￿ q)xL)
hB(f + ￿B(1 ￿ q)xL)
: (14)
As the merchant accepts the EPI, we have that bS ￿￿Sx(1￿q)L￿m￿CS(eS) ￿ 0. It follows
that (A2) is a su¢ cient condition for (14) to hold.
We can now prove that for any p > v,
d￿
dp
< 0: To simplify the notations, we denote by
g DB = DB(f + p ￿ v + ￿B(1 ￿ q)xL): We have
d￿
dp
= g DB ￿ hB(f + p ￿ v + ￿B(1 ￿ q)xL)(p ￿ d + bS ￿ ￿Sx(1 ￿ q)L ￿ m ￿ CS(eS))




hB(f + p ￿ v + ￿B(1 ￿ q)xL)
1 ￿ HB(f + p ￿ v + ￿B(1 ￿ q)xL)
(v ￿ d + bS ￿ ￿Sx(1 ￿ q)L ￿ m ￿ CS(eS))
￿
:
We have g DB ￿ 0. Therefore, a su¢ cient condition for
d￿
dp
< 0 to hold is that the term into
bracket is negative. The term into brackets is negative if and only if
v ￿ d + bS ￿ ￿Sx(1 ￿ q)L ￿ m ￿ CS(eS) ￿
1 ￿ HB(f + p ￿ v + ￿B(1 ￿ q)xL)
hB(f + p ￿ v + ￿B(1 ￿ q)xL)
:
As by assumption (A1) the hazard rate is increasing, we have that, for any p > v,
1 ￿ HB(f + p ￿ v + ￿B(1 ￿ q)xL)
hB(f + p ￿ v + ￿B(1 ￿ q)xL)
￿
1 ￿ HB(f + ￿B(1 ￿ q)xL)
hB(f + ￿B(1 ￿ q)xL)
:
From assumption (A2), we have that
v ￿ d + bS ￿ ￿Sx(1 ￿ q)L ￿ m ￿ CS(eS) ￿
1 ￿ HB(f + ￿B(1 ￿ q)xL)
hB(f + ￿B(1 ￿ q)xL)
:
It follows that
v ￿ d + bS ￿ ￿Sx(1 ￿ q)L ￿ m ￿ CS(eS) ￿
1 ￿ HB(f + p ￿ v + ￿B(1 ￿ q)xL)
hB(f + p ￿ v + ￿B(1 ￿ q)xL)
.
Therefore, we have that, for any p > v,
d￿
dp
< 0. It follows that the merchant makes more pro￿t
by setting p￿ = v, which enables him to attract cash-users and EPI users. We can conclude
that all merchants choose a price such that p￿ = v.
Appendix C: proof of Lemma 2. We proceed in two steps. First, we determine the pro￿t
maximising level of investment of a merchant who accepts the EPI. Second, we prove that, if32
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We now show that merchants accept the EPI if their transactional bene￿t bS is such that
bS ￿ b bS(￿S;￿B;x;L;m;f), which is the second step of our proof. A merchant accepts the EPI
if and only if
bS ￿ m ￿ ￿Sx(1 ￿ q)L ￿ CS(e￿
S) ￿ 0. (19)
Let us consider the function MS(y) = y ￿￿Sx(1￿q)L￿CS(e￿
S), where y = bS ￿m. Note that
(19) does not hold if y < 0, which happens if the merchant fee is too high. We have that
M0








































￿ 0. It follows that MS is increasing in y for all y ￿ 0. Note that
MS(0) ￿ 0 and that the sign of MS(y), where y = bS ￿m, depends on m. There are three cases.
Let us start by the ￿rst case, in which the merchant fee m is su¢ ciently high, such that




and for all y = bS ￿ m, we have
MS(y) < 0. It follows that no merchant accepts the EPI.
In the second case, the merchant fee m is su¢ ciently low, such that bS ￿ m > 0 and





y = bS ￿ m, we have MS(y) ￿ 0. It follows that all merchants accept the EPI.
In the third case, the merchant fee is such that MS(y) > 0 and MS(y) < 0. As MS
is increasing in y, from the bijection theorem, there exists a threshold that we denote by
b bS(￿S;￿B;x;L;m;f) such that merchants accept the EPI for all bS ￿ b bS(￿S;￿B;x;L;m;f).
























As from the second-order condition @2￿=@2eS ￿ 0, it follows that @e￿
















From the envelop theorem, @e￿
S=@m has the same sign as @2￿=@eS@m. It follows that the34
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1390
October 2011
B:G8=6CIRH >CK:HIB:CI 6AL6NH 9:8G:6H:H L>I= I=: B:G8=6CI ;:: ->B>A6GAN	L := 6 K :I = 6 I

"




#I ;DAADLH I=6I I=: B:G8=6CIRH >CK:HIB:CIH >C ;G6J9 9:I:8I>DC I:8=CDAD<>:H >C8G:6H: L>I= I=:
B:G8=6CIRH IG6CH68I>DC6A 7:C:PI
1: CDL HIJ9N I=: K6G>6I>DC D; I=: B:G8=6CIRH >CK:HIB:CIH L>I= I=: 8DCHJB:G IG6CH68I>DC
;:: /H>C< I=: H6B: G:6HDC>C<	 L: @CDL I=6I "






























 GDB I=: PGHI
















  1 :6 A H D= 6 K :
!	!#   #I ;DAADLH I=6I "#   H>C8: $

	 >H EDH>I>K: 1: 86C 8DC8AJ9: I=6I I=:
B:G8=6CIRH >CK:HIB:CI >C8G:6H:H L>I= I=: IG6CH68I>DC ;:: I=6I >H E6>9 7N I=: 8DCHJB:G
1: 9:I:GB>C: I=: K6G>6I>DC D; I=: B:G8=6CIRH >CK:HIB:CIH L>I= I=: 8DCHJB:G A>67>A>IN /H>C<
I=: H6B: G:6HDC>C<	 "




























M68IAN A>@: >C I=: EG:K>DJH EGDD;	 L: =6K: I=6I "	   H>C8: $

	 >H EDH>I>K: #I ;DAADLH
I=6I I=: B:G8=6CIRH >CK:HIB:CI >C8G:6H:H L>I= I=: 8DCHJB:G A>67>A>IN
&:I JH HIJ9N I=: K6G>6I>DC D; I=: B:G8=6CIRH >CK:HIB:CIH L>I= =>H A:K:A D; A>67>A>IN  GDB I=:
G:6HDC>C< 67DK:	 "










































  ,	  ("







 GDB 6HHJBEI>DC 	 L: =6K: I=6I









Working Paper Series No 1390
October 2011
As 1 ￿ q(e￿
S) 2 [0;1], it follows that









Therefore, we have that
1 ￿ xL￿B(1 ￿ q(e￿
S))












￿ 0 and xL DBje￿









It follows that, from assumption (A2), the merchant￿ s investments in fraud detection technolo-
gies increase with his liability level.
Appendix E: Proof of Lemma 4.
Impact of the level of liability borne by merchants on EPI acceptance: From
(2), the threshold above which merchants accept the EPI solves
b bS ￿ m ￿ ￿SxL(1 ￿ q￿) ￿ CS(e￿
S) = 0:




















































￿ 0. From Lemma 3, we know that de￿
S=d￿S ￿ 0.
It follows that the right-hand side of the equality is positive.
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It follows that @ b bS=@m ￿ 0.
Appendix F: Proof of Proposition 1. We start by determining the variation of the ex-
pected loss with the consumer fee. To that end, we denote by ￿(bS;f;m;￿S;￿B) the function
de￿ned by





































￿(1 ￿ q￿)h(bS)hB(f + ￿BxL(1 ￿ q￿)):
From Lemma 3, we have @e￿






It follows that @￿(bS;f;m;￿S;￿B)=@f ￿ 0. Since, from Lemma 4, @ b bS=@f ￿ 0, we conclude
that @EL=@f ￿ 0.
26The conditions to use the Leibniz rule apply.38
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From Lemma 3, we have @e￿






It follows that term A is negative, whereas term B is positive. Therefore, an increase in the
merchant fee has an ambiguous impact on the expected loss that is borne by the payment
platform.























































Appendix G: Second-order conditions if ￿B = 0.
Appendix G-A: second-order conditions if the payment platform chooses the
transaction prices. We provide here the second-order conditions of pro￿t maximisation if39
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S ) ￿ MPhS(bm





S )[DB(f) ￿ MPhB(f)] = 0: (22)
The second derivatives of the platform￿ s pro￿t with respect to the prices and the liability level
are
@2￿P
@m2 = ￿2hSDB ￿ h0
SDBMP; (23)
@2￿P




= ￿hBDS ￿ hSDB + MPhShB;
@2￿P
@m@￿S
= xL(1 ￿ q￿)
@2￿P






= xL(1 ￿ q￿)
@2￿P
@m@f







= ￿2xLDBhSxL(1 ￿ q￿)
￿


































We denote by detM the determinant of the Hessian matrix at the pro￿t maximising transaction
fees. It can be checked that the second-order conditions of pro￿t maximisation are veri￿ed as
h0
S ￿ 0 and h0
B ￿ 0. From (21) and (22), we have that, at the pro￿t maximising prices,
DS = MPhS and DB = MPhB. Therefore, we have


















which proves that the conditions for a maximum to exist at (f￿;m￿) hold.
Appendix G-B: second-order conditions if the payment platform chooses the
transaction prices and the level of liability for merchants. We provide here the con-
ditions under which the second-order conditions are veri￿ed at x￿ = (f￿;m￿;￿￿
S) by computing40
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We now compute a1a3 ￿ c2 and a3a2 ￿ d2 at x￿ = (f￿;m￿;￿￿
S). We have





































































We now show that detH ￿ 0 at x￿ = (f￿;m￿;￿￿
S). From the rule of Sarrus, we have
detH = a1a2a3 + 2bdc ￿ c2a2 ￿ b2a3 ￿ d2a1
= a1(a3a2 ￿ d2) + 2bdc ￿ c2a2 ￿ b2a3:
At x￿ = (f￿;m￿;￿￿
S), since a1 = ￿DS (2hB + MPh0
B), we have































Using the fact that, at x￿ = (f￿;m￿;￿￿















Since ￿ ￿ 0, we can conclude that detH ￿ 0 at x￿ = (f￿;m￿;￿￿
S). Therefore, the Hessian matrix
is semi-de￿nite negative at x￿ = (f￿;m￿;￿￿
S) and the second-order conditions are veri￿ed at
x￿ = (f￿;m￿;￿￿
S).
Appendix H: An illustration of Proposition 2. We make the following assumptions:
CS(eS) = k(eS)2=2, q(eS) = ￿eS, uniform distributions on [0;1] for bS and bB. In this case,
from equation (4), we have43
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In this case, we ￿nd that the platform￿ s pro￿t is maximised by choosing ￿S = 1.
Appendix I: Impact of the merchants￿liability on transaction prices.
Appendix I-A: impact of the merchants￿liability on transaction prices (general
case if ￿B = 0). In this Appendix, we examine how the level of liability borne by merchants
impacts the transaction fees that are chosen by the payment platform, if the zero liability rule
applies for consumers. By di⁄erentiating equations (21) and (22) that de￿ne the ￿rst-order
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We proved in Appendix G-A that detM ￿ 0. We now prove that R ￿ 0 and T ￿ 0. We have
R = ￿h2
BD2









Using the ￿rst-order condition, we have that, at the pro￿t maximising prices, MPhS = DS
and MPhB = DB. It follows that, at the pro￿t maximising prices,
R = hBhSDBDS + hSh0
BDSDBMP;
and




B are positive, we have R ￿ 0 and T ￿ 0. As @q￿=@￿S ￿ 0 and DetM > 0, it
follows that @m￿=@￿S ￿ 0 and @f￿=@￿S ￿ 0:























as @ b bS=@￿S = xL(1 ￿ q￿).
Appendix I-B: Application to the case of uniform distributions for bB and bS.
If bB and bS are uniformely distributed on [0;1], from the ￿rst order conditions, at the pro￿t
maximising prices, we have DB = DS = MP. In this case, we have R = T = D2
B. Therefore,
from (24), we have detM = 3D2
































From Lemma 6, we have @2q￿=@2￿S ￿ 0. Therefore, we can conclude that d2 b bS=d￿2
S ￿ 0 in the
case of uniform distributions on [0;1] for the transactional bene￿ts.46
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Appendix J: Social welfare analysis.
Appendix J-A:Variation of the consumer and the merchant surplus with the level
of liability borne by merchants. We start by computing the consumer surplus. Consumers
who pay cash do not obtain any surplus from making a transaction, as a monopolistic merchant
sets a price p￿ = v. A consumer of transactional bene￿t bB who pays with the EPI obtains a
surplus
bB ￿ f ￿ ￿BxL(1 ￿ q￿):
Agregating this expression over all bB 2
￿
f + ￿BxL(1 ￿ q￿);bB
￿









h(bS)E(bB ￿ f ￿ ￿BxL(1 ￿ q￿)=bB ￿ f + ￿BxL(1 ￿ q￿))dbS;
where E(bB ￿f ￿￿BxL(1￿q￿)=bB ￿ f +￿BxL(1￿q￿)) denotes the mathematical expectancy
conditional on bB ￿ f + ￿BxL(1 ￿ q￿). We have
@SB
@￿S












E(bB ￿ f ￿ ￿BxL(1 ￿ q￿)=bB ￿ f + ￿BxL(1 ￿ q￿))dbS;
where from the Leibniz rule,
@
@￿S




















First case ￿B = 0. In this case, from proposition 5, the transaction fees decrease with the
level of liability that is borne by merchants. Therefore, Y is positive. Term X is also positive,
since d b bS=d￿S ￿ 0 from (28). It follows that the consumer surplus increases with the level of
liability that is borne by the merchants.
Second case: ￿B 6= 0 [TO DO]
Similarly, we compute the agregate merchant surplus by agregating the merchants￿pro￿t47
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